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AU is Not Well
An economy runs on both physical and
human capital. In 1960, the cost ofmaintain-
ing human capital-health care costs-
represented about 6 percentofgross national
product This share is projected to double by
1990. While recognizing the importance of
high quality medical care, there is a growing
consensus that health care costs have "gone
outofcontrol" (the cost of ahospital room
alone has doubled inthe lastfive years). Such
escalation raises problems for both the pri-
vate and public sectors.
At present, businesses spend nearly $60 bil-
Iiona yearon employeehealth insurance and
the share ofthe federal budget devoted to
health expenditures has reached 1° percent
Because previous regulatory approaches to
controlling health care costs (such as the
Carter Administration's Hospital Cost Con-
tainment Program) were largely ineffective,
health insurers and some policymakers are
seeking to unleash competitive market forces
in the health services industry. To understand
the rationale behind these approaches, it is
necessary to understand the special eco-
nomic nature ofthe health services industry.
Health services industry
Unlike many other industries, the health
servic.es industry is largely self-regulated, a
legacy of the way in which the field ofmedi-
cine evolved in the United States. Prior to
about 1850, the industry was virtually unreg-
ulated, allowing free entry and exit ofhos-
pitals and training institutions. In 1847, the _
American Medical Association (AMA) was
formed to ensure that this system did not
produce low-quality personnel and services.
Over the years since then, the AMA has ob-
tained wide-ranging legislative authority to
accredit medical schools, practitioners, and
health care facilities. Critics oforganized
medicine (such as John Goodman ofthe
CATO Institute) argue that this legislative
authority has permitted the self-regulators to
go beyond concerns overquality control and
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become a cartel controlling prices and ser-
vices for the benefit ofits members.
Through its accreditation authority, for
example, organized medicine has had the
power to limit supply and resist the entry of
low-cost competition. One often-cited case
was the strong reaction oforganized medi-
cine in the 1940's to the formation ofthe
Kaiser Foundation Plan ofCalifornia, which
provided health services in a prepaid (rather
than fee-far-service) format The local
medical society barred Kaiser's staff from
membership and found the Kaiser Plan's
directorguiltyofunethical medical practices.
It took a 1943 Supreme Court ruling to over-
rule the authority oforganized medicine
in this area and to permit the creation of
Kaiser-type services.
In addition, some ofthe restraints organized
medicine puts on its members, such as the
ban on advertising, can be interpreted as
mechanisms designed to limit price and
quality competition. According to a study
performed bytheFood and DrugAdministra-
tion, for example, when the ban on advertis-
ingcontact lens prices was lifted in 1975,
average prices dropped 30 percent
Finally, critics point outthatthe unusual
financial rewards enjoyed in the health ser-
vices industryare in themselves evidenceofa
successful restriction ofsupply. Physicians'
reported incomehas grown much faster than
the median income over most ofthe last fifty
years. And, as cited earlier, the incomeofthe
medical services industry as a whole has
taken an ever increasingshareofthe national
income.
The response ofthe medical profession to
such criticism is thatprofessional control over
supply is necessary to ensure quality control.
And, indeed, it is widelyagreed thatthe AMA
has done much to reduce medical quackery.
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tion, the effect is still the same-to limitthe
supply ofhealth selVices.
Enter insurance
Even in a constrained supply environment,
however, the income to the profession is
limited by demand-theability and willing-
ness ofthe patienttopay. The medical profes-
sion learned this lesson during the 1930's
when the depressed income ofthe general
population created payment problems for
physicians and hospitals. In response,
organized medicineentered into a new sub-
industry-health insurance. It created the
predecessors oftoday's non-profit Blue Cross
and Blue Shield. The marketing ofthese pro-
fessionally sponsored plans was facilitated
both by special tax and regulatory conces-
sions and, inadvertently, by the wage and
price control policies ofWorld War II.
Unableto provide directpay increases,
employers began offering improved benefit
packages, especially in the form of health
insurance. As this practiceofemployment-
linked insurance coverage spread, it weak-
ened consumer incentives to economize on
medical care and increased substantially the
revenue potential for organized medicine.
Direct patient payments for medical care
todayare less than 3S percentoftotal medical
expenditures. In 1950, they were 80 percent.
Medicare
Another major factor in recent health care
cost escalation has been the increased in-
volvementofgovernments in the provision
ofhealth care coverage. As health insurance
became linked more and more with employ-
ment, the poor and the elderly, with weak
links to employment, had inferior access to
health insurance. The federal Medicare legis-
lation of 1965 was an attemptto provide
health care for the poor and elderly. But
its reimbursement procedures contained dis-
incentives for cost containment, particularly
at the hospital level. The procedures essen-
tiallyguaranteed reimbursementofcosts, and
hospitals therefore had little incentive to
operate efficiently. As a result, hospital costs
have been the leader in increasing Medicare
costs that nowexceed $80 billion per year.
2
Proxy demand
A final feature ofthe health selVices industry
that mayhavecontributed to the cost spiral is
that the consumerofmedical selVices has
unusually limited ability to determine his
own need for such selVices. Acting as a
"proxydemander" for the patient, the physi-
cian can create demand for tests, surgical
procedures, and repeat visits, particularly
when insurance largely insul'ltes the patient
from the resulting costS. The frequency of
surgical procedures, for example, appears to
be greater in a conventional fee-for-selVice
environmentthan in a pre-paid environment
(wheretheproviderhas an incentiveto avoid
unnecessary procedures).
Unleashing competition ...demand
It is clear from this overviewthatthe prob-
lems with the health selVices industryorigi-
nate from a multitudeofsources, both on the
demand and supply sides ofthemarket. Solu-
tions, therefore, must address both sides.
Onthe demand side, generous insurance
coverage insulates the consumer from many
cost considerations. Oneobvious remedy is
to increasethe portion ofthe health care costs
borne by the patient (increasing the so-called
"copayment") at leastfornon-majormedical
levels oftreatment. The Reagan Administra-
tion cautiously proposed such a notion for
medicare coverage (with the copayment
level linkedtoameans test) but itwas greeted
by a firestorm ofopposition from Medicare
proponents. Similarly, private health insurers
have found itdifficult to market high co-
paymentplans.
As an alternative, some large health insur-
ance companies and corporations are using
their bargaining powerto locate "preferred
providers"-doctors, dentists and hospitals
that agree to discountthe costoftheirservices
in return for a secure base ofclients. The .
employer then provides a financial incentive
to its employees to utllize these preferred
providers. The sketchy evidence ofthe few
such arrangements in place suggests cost sav-
ingsof10 to 30percent. Unfortunately,broad






requires special changes in state insurance
regulations and these changes are often op-
posed by the medical societies. In the State
ofCalifornia, however, such opposition was
unsuccessful and Assembly Bill 3480 recent-
ly cleared the way for the use ofthe preferred
provider method by private insurers. An
allied measure, Assembly Bill 799, permits
the State itselfto negotiate fees for services
provided to its needy MediCal patients.
At the federal level, analogous proposals are
underconsideration. The Reagan Adminis-
tration wants to replace the cost-reimburse-
ment policies ofMedicare with a so-called
"prospective reimbursement" policy-
providers wouId receive a pre-negotiated fee
for the treatment of450 different illnesses.
.•.supply
Steps have also been taken to influence
supplypositively. Onemajor step, taken
almosttwo decades ago was to increase the
supplyofphysicians. Underafederal subsidy
plan (the Health Professionals Educational
AssistanceActof1963),the numberofphysi-
cians per 1,000 population in the United
States rose from 1.43 in 1965 to 1.84in 1979.
Yet there is some question whether such an
increase in supplywill translate into lower
physician fees because ofthe alleged ability
ofthe physician to increase the demand for
services until a desired income is achieved.
This so-called target-income hypothesis,
although shown by economist George
Sweeney to be theoretically feasible, is diffi-
cult to demonstrate except anecdotally. (The
Urban Institute, for example, found that
doctors responded to the wage and price
controlsoftheearly 1970'ssimplybyincreas:
ing the volumeofservices and procedures
performed to restore their target incomes.)
But itdoes seem unlikely that further relative
increases in the physician population will
lead to substantive reductions in physicians'
fees.
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zation (HMO) form ofmedical service. Here,
theorganization receives aflatfee forprovid-
ing forthe complete health care ofthe en-
rolled individual. Incentives are strong in
such organizations (such as the Kaiser plan
and Blue Cross's "Take Care") to keep costs
low because the plans are notreimbursed on
a procedure-by-procedure basis. They also
have incentives to providepreventative
medical servicestoavoidfuture costs. Harold
Luft ofthe UniversityofCalifornia's Health
Policy Research Institute has shown that
savings ofas much as 40 percent can be
achieved by this form ofhealth care delivery
system, in comparison to the traditional fee-
for-service method, without a sacrifice in
quality. Employers and their employees have
found HMO'sattractive. Indeed, nationally,
the numberofHMOmembers increased at
an 11.3 percent annual rate from 1976to
1981 while the total numberofpersons with
private health insurance went up byonly a 1
percent annual rate duringthe same period.
Conclusion
The health care problem appears to be a
tangle ofinappropriate economic structures
and incentives. Thissuggests thatmuchofthe
recent growth in expenditures probably rep-
resents pure economic waste rather than a
major increase in theoverall qualityofcare.
Majorchanges in the healthcare marketplace
will likely be opposed by organized medi-
cine. (Indeed, the AMAhas recently sought
blanketexemption from Federal Trade Com-
mission authority in an attempt to protect
its role as a primary self-regulatorofthe in-
dustry.) Butwithoutsome majorchanges, the
cost ofmedical care in the United States will
impose a growing burden on the economy.
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Selected Assets and Liabilities
largeCommercial Banks
. o ar ercen
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments" 162,980 402 6,456 4,1
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total# 142,797 224 7,451 5.5
Commercial and industrial 45,453 421 4,120 10.0
Real estate 57,344 - 95 1,534 2.7
Loans to individuals 23,833 44 171 0.7
Securities loans 2,736 - 227 478 21.2
U.s. TreasUlY securities* 6,986 - 19 1,100 18.7
Other securities* 13,197 197 - 2,095 - 13.7
Demand deposits - total# 42,069 -2,017 - 529 - 1.2
Demand deposits - adjusted 28,798 416 - 139 - 0.5
Savings deposits - total 41,502 4,296 11,480 38,2
Time deposits- - total# 90,229 -2,854 528 0,6
Individuals, part. & corp. 80,323 -2,822 - 325 - 0.4









Member Bank Reserve Position
Excess Reserves (+l/Deficiency (-)
Borrowings










" Excludes trading account securities.
# Includes items not shown separately.
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